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THE INTRINSIC FLAW IN TAXATION IMPEDING 
TAX COMPLIANCE 
Limor Riza* 
Would you like to decide how your tax payments are used?  Let us 
elaborate the question: would you like to decide how your tax payments are 
used without interfering with equity issues?  Do you think it will induce 
you (and your neighbors) to pay taxes? 
This paper examines whether we should advocate a normative 
principle for allocating tax payments—beyond revenue raising—to enhance 
tax compliance.  The paper endeavors to tackle tax evasion from a specific 
angle by understanding the intrinsic flaw in taxation—the unrequited 
payment factor.  The paper presents the newly coined de jure benefit 
principle, somewhat in line with the Wicksellian approach, which helps 
both to preserve equity and enhance tax compliance.  The new principle 
does not mean that people pay for the public goods they consume but rather 
that they choose how their tax dollars are spent, without directly interfering 
with state sovereignty.  The paper proposes a mechanism for implementing 
the de jure benefit principle by linking the expenditure side to revenue 
raising to enhance tax compliance without affecting equity considerations 
or radically transforming the current system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines whether we should advocate a normative 
principle for allocating tax payments—beyond revenue raising—to enhance 
tax compliance.  The paper endeavors to tackle tax evasion from a specific 
angle by understanding the intrinsic flaw in taxation—the unrequited 
payment factor.  This tax evasion problem arises partly due to a conflict of 
interests but mainly due to lack of information flow from both the state to 
the taxpayer and in the opposite direction.  This dual information flow 
problem means that the government cannot always fully assess taxpayers’ 
income (Type I agency problem) and that the taxpayer cannot assess how 
the government spends his taxes (Type II agency problem).  This paper 
discusses the problematic linkage between those two agency problems — 
tax evasion and lack of information on government spending.  The 
perceived remoteness of the compulsory payment from its benefit, 
combined with particular taxpayer cognitive biases also discussed below, is 
critical to the compliance discussion. 
The paper presents the newly coined de jure benefit principle, which 
helps both to preserve equity and enhance tax compliance.  The new 
principle does not mean that people pay for the public goods they consume 
but rather that they choose how their tax dollars are spent, without directly 
interfering with state sovereignty.  The paper proposes a mechanism for 
implementing the de jure benefit principle by linking the expenditure side 
to revenue raising to enhance tax compliance without affecting equity 
considerations or radically transforming the current system.  Thus, the 
proposal detailed below can overcome some intrinsic flaws in taxation. 
In order to maintain government sovereignty and at the same time also 
equity, the proposed mechanism is only applicable to tax systems which 
partly use voluntary tax compliance.  The de jure benefit principle is 
somewhat in line with the Wicksellian approach.  It strengthens the 
information flow between the taxpayers and the government, thereby 
solving Type I and Type II agency problems.  Consequently, it can 
dramatically mitigate underreporting and underpayment problems 
generated by the intrinsic flaw of taxation, and increase tax compliance. 
The paper is interdisciplinary, relying on both behavioral economic 
insights and theoretical tax discourse.  It should be noted that the 
application of the psychological perspective is not unique in legal debates.  
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Analysis based on behavioral economics literature can be found both in law 
in general and in tax law in particular.  Feldman and Lobel, for example, 
examine legal mechanisms promoting whistleblowing in various legal 
fields such as labor and tax law through the lenses of behavioral 
economics.1  McCaffery and Baron, on the other hand, focus chiefly on tax 
law in their discussion of the much broader question of tax policy and 
redistribution, and employ a behavioral model.2 
The tax compliance literature based on behavioral economics is 
extensive and has yielded many intriguing recommendations.  For example, 
Mazar, Amir and Ariely use a laboratory experiment to examine how to 
influence individual self-awareness with regard to taxation.3  One of their 
proposals is to have taxpayers sign an honor code prior to filing the tax 
return to encourage honesty.  Although not directly related to the questions 
at stake here, their work has inspired us.  We are also indebted to Listokin 
and Schizer’s work4 which will be referred to in greater detail below. 
In general, the behavioral economics literature is particularly 
important in the context of tax compliance where collecting tax is mainly 
the result of willingness to declare incomes and pay taxes.  Some golf fans 
(or actually vice versa — golf anti-fans) might be interested to know that 
Ariely analogizes golf to taxes: “golf and taxes seem to turn up a lot.”5  In a 
questionnaire study of golf players’ honesty it was found that some golfers 
do not mind moving the ball a bit further to get a better score.6  Ariely 
 
* Limor Riza, School of Law, Carmel Academic Center. 
I would like to thank the participants of the TRN’s 23rd Annual Conference, the 2nd Annual 
TARC Workshop and especially to Jeremy Sherwood, Michael Ben Gad, Brian Keegan, 
Jonathan Farrar, John Hasseldine, and Noam Sher for their valuable comments on a 
previous version of this manuscript.  
 1.  Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative 
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 1151 (2010) (examining individuals’ motivation to report illegal activity 
(especially illegal employment)).  
 2.  Edward McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (2005). 
 3.  Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory 
of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008). 
 4.  For a discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities between this paper and 
Listokin & Schizer, see discussion accompanying footnote 138.  See Yair Listokin & David 
M. Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government Spending and the 
Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179 (2013) (suggesting some tax policy 
applications based on the unproven proposition that taxpayers would tend to comply with 
tax payments if they could have supported the method in which their money is spent). 
 5.  Dan Ariely,  The Encyclopedia Of Ethical Failure. . ., DAN ARIELY (Dec. 1, 2012), 
http://danariely.com/2012/12/01/the-encyclopedia-of-ethical-failure/ 
[https://perma.cc/K753-KCZV]. 
 6.  Dan Ariely, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE LIE TO EVERYONE 
– ESPECIALLY OURSELVES 55-66 (2012); Scott McKenzie, Driven to Cheat: A Study on the 
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claims that people tend to cheat more when there is psychological distance 
between the act and the outcome7 — just like when playing golf or filing a 
tax return.  As Will Rogers famously put it, “the [i]ncome [t]ax has made 
more [l]iars out of the American people than [g]olf has.”8 
Section II presents the problem of tax evasion.  Section III presents the 
principal models of both utility maximizing and behavioral economic 
theories.  Readers familiar with these subjects may wish to skip this 
introductory section.  Next, Section IV addresses the rationales of tax 
evasion and explores related specific cognitive biases.  The following 
section presents empirical findings on the correlation between tax and 
return.  This brings us to Section VI which defines tax and mainly its third 
component—quid pro quo.  Section VII proposes the de jure benefit 
principle and the innovative recommendation derived from it, followed by 
a concluding section. 
I. THE TAX EVASION PROBLEM 
The problem of tax evasion is ubiquitous and has been recognized 
since ancient times.9  It is straightforward: if citizens do not pay their share 
to civil society, the government will be unable to offer appropriate services 
to the public.  Moreover, all citizens freely consume the services offered by 
the government including those free riders who have evaded tax.  Evasion 
also means that if a person with similar welfare to another evades while the 
other complies, it infringes the equity principle.  Finally, tax evasion 
hinders redistribution. 
Since it is clear that when the government faces revenue deficiency 
(i.e., tax gap)10 it cannot provide adequate services, it is worthwhile to 
quantify the tax gap.11  The estimated tax gap for 2006 in United States was 
 
Drivers of Dishonesty–through the Game of Golf 40-41 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished A.B. 
thesis, Duke University), 
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/1400/McKenzie%2c%20Scott.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9PNY-Z8RT]. 
 7.  Ariely, supra note 6, at 59. 
 8.  Will Rogers, Helping the Girls with Their Income Taxes, in THE ILLITERATE DIGEST 
72 (1924) (as quoted in ESSENTIAL QUOTATIONS DICTIONARY 436 (1998)). 
 9.  See generally Samuel Blankson, A Brief History of Taxation (2007) (discussing the 
taxes in the context of Ancient Egypt, China, Greece, India, and the Inca and Roman 
Empires). 
 10.  Tax gap is the difference between tax that should have been paid by taxpayers and 
their de facto payments and consists of three elements: non-filing, underreporting and 
underpayment. Ed Nannenhorn, Tax Administration, Federal, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION 
& TAX POLICY 383 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2005).  Thus, tax evasion constitutes part of 
the tax gap.  
 11.  See Jacqui McManus & Neil Warren, The Case for Measuring Tax Gap, 4(1) EJ. 
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$385 billion.12  It was further estimated that 83% of taxpayers paid their 
taxes voluntarily on time and that 85.5% eventually paid their tax 
liability.13  This means a 14.5% noncompliance rate.14 
Though people tend to think that it is mainly businesspersons who 
evade tax, studies indicate differently.  Even the “average” person tends to 
cheat if only he has the opportunity to do so.  In the 1980s an exemption 
allowance was granted to dependents in the US.15  Taxpayers claimed this 
exemption via their tax returns.  For claiming this exemption, taxpayers 
were not requested to disclose full details on their dependents such as their 
social security number.  Tax authorities suspected that taxpayers did not 
accurately declare their dependents, so the regulation was slightly 
amended, requiring taxpayers to also submit the dependent’s SSN.  Lo and 
behold, within one year seven million dependents faded away from 
American society and the public treasury grossed an extra three billion a 
year.16 
As tax evasion is a major concern for governments around the world, 
many mechanisms have been developed to mitigate the problem.  
Accordingly, the tax evasion literature is preoccupied with understanding 
how taxpayers would react to each proposed law.  It can be roughly divided 
into the utility maximizing theory and behavioral models; these are briefly 
 
TAX RES. 61 (2006) (discussing the pros and cons of “tax gap” estimation). 
 12.  I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-4 (Jan. 6, 2012) — IRS Releases New Tax Gap 
Estimates; Compliance Rates Remain Statistically Unchanged From Previous Study, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Releases-New-Tax-Gap-Estimates;-Compliance-Rates-Remain-
Statistically-Unchanged-From-Previous-Study [https://perma.cc/27MT-7F9D]. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  There are three main kinds of tax evasion: non-filing, underreporting and 
underpayment.  Id.  In some countries such as Canada the tax authorities do not fully 
calculate the tax gap.  See Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax 
Evasion, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 33 (2007) (“No other country has undertaken a broad-based 
analysis of tax evasion like the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program or the National 
Research Program.”) [hereinafter Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves].  Also, in Australia, the tax 
authorities do not attempt to calculate the overall tax gap but rather specific tax gaps which 
may be significant.  McManus & Warren, supra note 11, at 70.  For instance, the goods and 
services tax (GST) gap for 2012-2013 was estimated at $3.1 billion (excluding debt), or 6% 
of the theoretical revenue.  GST Administration Annual Performance Report 2013-2014, 
AUSTL. TAX’N OFF., https://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/About-us/In-detail/Key-
documents/GST-administration-annual-performance-report-2013-14/?page=13 
[https://perma.cc/Q46F-CQ9N] (last modified Dec. 22, 2014). 
 15.  See John A. Szilagyi, Where Have All the Dependents Gone?, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE TREND ANALYSIS AND RELATED STATISTICS – 1990 UPDATE (Publication 1500 
(August), Washington DC: IRS, 1990) as referred to in Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, TAXING 
OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 175-76 n. 43 (4th ed. 2008) 
(discussing the impact of requiring dependents over the age of 5 to report their Social 
Security number to claim the exemption). 
 16.  Id. 
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explored in the following section. 
II. RATIONAL CHOICE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC MODELS OF 
COMPLIANCE 
The basic rational choice model treats taxpayers as rational actors who 
wish to maximize their profits.  This means that the rational taxpayer is 
able to process the relevant information and evade tax when the expected 
utility exceeds the expected loss (in the form of fines and other sanctions).17  
Dishonesty, then, is perceived as a rational action performed by an 
individual who is simply self-centered. 
One of the main faults of the utility maximizing theory is that it does 
not reflect reality.  Given a very low audit probability and relatively low 
expected legal penalties in addition to relatively high rates of voluntary tax 
compliance, the utility maximizing theory is insufficient.18  Some scholars 
thus suggest that individuals comply with the law due to a “general norm of 
law-abiding behavior.”19 
 
 17.  See Becker’s pioneering work: Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176 (1968) (taking the approach that “follows the 
economists’ usual analysis of choice and assumes that a person commits an offense if the 
expected utility. . . exceeds the utility he could get by using his time. . . at other activities.”).  
A landmark research following Becker’s work on tax compliance was performed by 
Allingham and Sandmo: Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A 
Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972).  This latter work served as the basis for an 
extensive literature, such as Yitzhaki’s work which modifies the Allingham-Sandmo model: 
Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J. PUB. ECON. 
201 (1974).  
 18.  See James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 818, 821 (1998) (“The fact that most taxpayers face a low probability of 
detection and small expected penalty puts the earlier statistics on noncompliance in a 
different light.”); see also Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax 
Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1784 (2000) (“Given the low penalty for tax evasion and 
the audit rate, tax evasion should be widespread. Yet the IRS estimates that 83% of taxes are 
collected.”). 
 19.  Posner, supra note 18, at 1782.  Posner believes that the explanation for this 
phenomenon is the signaling model, where people obtain some private information about 
their preferences (id. at 1787); nevertheless, “if information were costless, so that 
individuals knew all the characteristics of potential cooperative partners, social norms would 
not exist.”  Id. at 1819.  But see Dan M. Kahan, Commentaries on Eric Posner’s Law and 
Social Norms: Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social 
Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367 (2002) (Kahan opposes Posner’s reputational signaling 
model and supports the reciprocity model.  The author believes that the latter model is better 
understood under three criteria—behavioral realism, political feasibility and moral 
acceptability).  For the discussion on tax morale see generally Benno Torgler, Moral 
Suasion: An Alternative Tax Policy Strategy? Evidence from a Controlled Field Experiment 
in Switzerland, 5 ECON. GOV. 235, 236 (2004) (analyzing the effects of “moral suasion on 
tax morale”). 
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In 1967 a field study by Schwartz and Orleans already showed that in 
general, taxpayers react to moral appeals more than to simply legal 
sanctions, though both have effects on individuals.20  This study indicates 
the shortcomings of the utility maximizing theory.  Behavioral economic 
models, therefore, point out that there is more to cost-benefit analysis and 
that rational models cannot fully explain taxpayers’ compliance.21  
Individuals tend to act emotionally and sometimes base their decisions on 
heuristics since the process of getting and absorbing information is costly.  
Much of the neoclassical economic models are based on the idea that 
economic actors respond to external incentives.  Social psychology 
introduces “tax morale,”22 the term intrinsic motivation23 (such as honesty 
and altruism),24 and other explanations challenging neoclassical thought.25  
Accordingly, individuals voluntarily comply with tax payment thanks to 
social and personal norms such as trust, altruism and reciprocity.26 
 
 20.  See Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 
274 (1967) (arguing that it is not a rational decision to react to legal sanctions because of 
deterrence, but rather because it induces moralism). 
 21.  See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 18, at 850 (discussing the incorporation of 
morals and social dynamics into the models); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale 
Approach to Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 604 (2007) 
[hereinafter Kornhauser, Tax Morale Approach] (discussing the incorporation of “moral, 
psychological, and social factors influencing tax compliance.”); Benno Torgler et al., Is 
Forgiveness Divine? A Cross-Culture Comparison of Tax Amnesties, 139 SCHWEIZ. 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT UND STATISTIK 375, 392 (2003) (discussing how 
differences in social norms and social institutions influence tax compliance rates cross 
culturally). 
 22.  E.g., Torgler, supra note 19, at 236; Kornhauser, Tax Morale Approach, supra note 
21, at 602. 
 23.  See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURV. 
589, 589-91 (2001) (showing the development of the intrinsic motivation). 
 24.  See, e.g., Kornhauser, Tax Morale Approach, supra note 21, at 612-17 (discussing 
the role of honesty and altruism). 
 25.  Frey & Jegen, supra note 23, at 590, 591.  See Erich Kirchler, THE ECONOMIC 
PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 117-118 (2007) (discussing taxpayers’ subjective 
behaviors); Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. 
J. 1043 (1997) (discussing the civil virtue explanation). 
 26.  See Kornhauser, Tax Morale Approach, supra note 21, at 602-03 (“[S]ocial norms, 
personal values and various cognitive processes . . . strongly affect an individual’s 
voluntary compliance with laws.”); Listokin and Schizer, supra note 4, at 185-87 
(discussing the role of trust and altruism in fostering tax compliance).  For the correlation 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in general, see Frey & Jegen, supra note 23; Uri 
Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).  For the 
correlation between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the tax field, see Catherine C. 
Eckel, Philip J. Grossman and Rachel M. Johnston, An Experimental Test of the Crowding 
out Hypothesis, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1543 (2005) (finding that when a payment was introduced 
as compulsory, it caused a crowding-out effect); see also Frey & Jegen, supra note 23, at 
605) (finding that a distrustful tax law impairs tax morale and increases evasion).  
Additional financial punishment may erode intrinsic motivation, Erich Kirchler, Erich Hölzl 
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III. WHY DO PEOPLE PAY (OR EVADE) TAX? 
A. Noncompliance Explanations 
As noted above, some people voluntarily comply with tax payment 
because of “tax morale,” but still why do some people pay taxes27 while 
others evade them?  Below we shall present some reasoning for tax 
evasion.  Nevertheless, since the literature on tax evasion is extensive, this 
is just a brief outline of the key approaches. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: As presented above, rational individuals make a 
cost-benefit analysis, balancing the costs of being detected with the benefits 
of successful evasion.  They may estimate the enforcement and auditing 
probabilities28 and realize that the chance of being caught may be very low.  
This reasoning is attributed to the rational choice theory.29  Nevertheless, a 
recent study shows that the sanctions for evasion are not necessarily merely 
monetary, but also nonmonetary (referred to in the literature as “collateral 
tax sanction”).30 
The Libertarian Approach and Alienation: Some people may be self-
interested and believe that the money they have made is theirs and the 
government is not entitled to tax them.31  This libertarian approach may 
also suggest that those people do not feel part of a community or society.32  
On the contrary, it seems that people tend to pay more taxes if they feel that 
 
& Ingrid Wahl, Enforced Versus Voluntary Tax Compliance: The ‘Slippery Slope’ 
Framework, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 210 (2008), but not when it helps increase the sense of 
fairness among taxpayers.  Frey, supra note 25, at 1049.  A specific illustration of the effect 
of tax rewards on tax morale is the research on tax amnesties.  See Torgler et al., supra note 
21 (examining whether tax amnesties interfere with individuals’ moral standards and finding 
that “civic duty” increases compliance).  For a new approach combining intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation into one model, see Mazar, On Amir & Ariely, supra note 3.  
 27.  For a discussion on “why do people pay taxes,” see Joshua D. Blank, Collateral 
Compliance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 746-48 (2014). 
 28.  See, e.g., James Alm et al., Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions, and 
Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 291-93 (1993) (weighing the tax rate, the 
audit rate, and the penalty rate in the voluntary compliance system).  There are over 100 
different civil tax penalties in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).  Blank, supra note 27, at 
729 (citing U.S.C. §§ 6651-6702 (2012)). 
 29.  The rational choice theory is briefly described in Section II. 
 30.  Those nonmonetary sanctions are not applied by the IRS, but rather by non-tax 
agencies and can be briefly defined as “additional penalties that occur outside of the tax 
system.”  Blank, supra note 27, at 735.  However, the collateral tax sanction theory is based 
on behavioral research, not on the rational choice theory.  Id. at 725. 
 31.  This view is contrary to the view that it is the citizens’ moral duty to pay taxes.  
See, e.g., Blank, supra note 27, at 766 (discussing how collateral tax sanctions reinforce 
individuals’ feeling that tax compliance as a duty of citizenship). 
 32.  For a contrary argument showing that people may pay when they sympathize with 
the cause, see Listokin & Schizer, supra note 4, at 190-91 and accompanying references.  
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they belong to a smaller group.33 
Coercion: Another explanation is simply that people do not like to be 
coerced to pay money.  Some studies show that people volunteer to donate 
even if they complain that their taxes are too high.34 
Unfairness: Some people believe that taxes are simply unfair.  For 
example, studies show that Americans believe that rich people do not pay 
enough taxes.35  On the contrary, where taxes are regarded as fair, 
individuals tend to comply with tax payments.36 
Reciprocity and Social Acceptance: In some societies, it is socially 
accepted or at least non-reproachable to evade.  Tax evasion in those 
societies is not considered to be an intolerable act.37  Another explanation, 
related to the “fairness” argument above, is that if people believe that their 
neighbor does not pay taxes they wonder why they should pay.38 
Outcome Remoteness: Other individuals are disinclined to pay taxes 
because they believe governments disregard their wishes.39  A similar but 
slightly different phrasing is that there are individuals who feel their tax 
payments are misused.  This is the Type II agency problem described 
above. 
This brief discussion shows that the reasoning for tax evasion is highly 
varied.  A single model cannot encompass all the hypothesized causes of 
tax evasion.  This paper focuses on the latter problem—the argument that 
taxpayers do not agree with the way the government is spending their tax 
dollars (Type II agency problem). 
B. Human Biases: Identifiable Victim Effect, Isolation Effect & Other 
“Short-Term Biases” 
The studies described above demonstrate that we cannot discuss tax 
compliance and offer legal revisions without first understanding human 
 
 33.  See, e.g., id. at 186-87 (discussing the “size and in-group effects”). 
 34.  See Sherry Xin Li et al., Giving to Government: Voluntary Taxation in the Lab, 95 
J. PUB. ECON. 1190 (2011) (exploring the inconsistency between negative attitudes about 
taxation and donations to non-profit causes). 
 35.  See Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 15, at 72 (describing an April 2006 Gallup poll 
where 67% of people felt that “upper-income people” paid “too little” in tax payments). 
 36.  This is part of the tax morale writings discussed in Section III; see also Listokin & 
Schizer, supra note 4, at 185-86 (noting that a perception of fairness in tax administration 
raises tax compliance rates). 
 37.  Kirchler, supra note 25, at 65. 
 38.  See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic 
Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 845, 854 (1998) (discussing how 
people are motivated by reciprocity outside of the taxation context). 
 39.  See Alm et al., supra note 28, at 285 (noting that individuals may be less inclined 
to pay taxes when they feel that government is unresponsive to their wishes). 
ARTICLE 6 (RIZA) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:32 PM 
896 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
nature and people’s reasoning for evading tax.  Behavioral models 
recognize that there is more to cost analysis, and individuals may comply 
and pay their taxes due to an inner moral call, a motive that can often be 
manipulated.40 
The behavioral economics literature is replete with discussions of 
cognitive biases.  Here we would like to present only the deficiencies 
pertinent to the question presented in the paper, starting with the 
identifiable victim effect. 
Let us put tax issues aside for now and concentrate on other issues.  
How would you react if you were informed of a tragedy suffered by a 
specific individual, as opposed to a natural catastrophe where thousands of 
people unknown to you lost their relatives and homes?  Utilitarian social 
welfare may treat the latter as a much severer loss for society, but studies 
show that you probably feel more empathy towards the former individual 
who experienced a personal tragedy.  This is due to the identifiable victim 
effect.41  Scholars dispute the factors behind this effect, and several have 
been offered in the literature.42  First, the vividness factor—the vivid image 
of the identified victim makes us feel we know the person and thus care 
more about him.43  Second, the certainty and uncertainty factor related to 
prospect theory and the finding that people are risk averse to losses.  The 
identified victim could be conceptualized as a certain gain and thus 
preferable to unidentified potential victims.44  Third, the reference group 
effect45— people tend to care more about risk that occurs in a smaller area.  
 
 40.  See, e.g., Kornhauser, Tax Morale Approach, supra note 21 (recommending 
various mechanisms to apply behavioral economic thinking—especially tax morale—to 
enhance compliance based on a behavioral economic survey).  Kornhauser’s three 
recommendations are based on the idea of tax morale as discussed in behavioral economics: 
first, establish a separate IRS division to survey tax morale; second, adopt a tax morale 
approach to compliance by recognizing taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation; and third, educate 
society to comply with tax payment.  Id. at 626.  Kornhauser believes that education is an 
important mechanism that can contribute to disciplining taxpayers to file returns on time, 
feel less frustrated by tax complexity and feel a greater sense of reciprocity and fairness.  Id. 
at 629, 631.  She also recommends starting the tax education process from an early stage to 
help shape tax morale. Id. 
 41.  Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect”, 
14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 236 (1997); Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, 
Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003) [hereinafter Small, Helping a Victim]; Deborah A. Small & George 
Loewenstein, The Devil You Know: The Effects of Identifiability on Punishment, 18 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 311, 311-13 (2005).  
 42.  See Jenni & Lowenstein, supra note 41, at 237-39 (discussing potential causes of 
the identifiable victim effect). 
 43.  Id. at 237. 
 44.  Id. at 238. 
 45.  This effect received vast empirical support.  See, e.g., Small, Helping a Victim, 
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For example, people are more deeply affected by a story that “X out of X” 
people will die than the same amount of casualties out of millions.  
Identified victims are analogous to the first case since they create their own 
reference group.46  Finally, ex-post versus ex-ante evaluation: usually, the 
decision to take action with regard to an identified victim is ex-post and 
with regard to statistical victims it is ex ante.  Once the tragedy has 
occurred it is more difficult for people to escape feelings of blame and 
responsibility.47 
Out of the four major explanations proposed, experiments support 
mainly the reference group explanation for the identifiable victim effect.48  
Some scholars termed this phenomenon “psychophysical numbing,”49 since 
people actually consider the same amount of lives saved to be much higher 
when the tested group is smaller.  In other words, they look at the 
proportion of lives that can be saved and prefer a higher one; otherwise 
they feel they save only “a drop in the bucket.”50  Other studies showed that 
people react emotionally even to a weak version of identifiability without 
concrete information on the victim’s identity.51  Thus, it is sufficient to 
point out a victim out of lists of victims to trigger the effect.52 
The implication of the identifiable victim effect for taxation may 
indicate that people cannot grasp the consequences of tax evasion since the 
victim is too indeterminate.  But in order to better understand how the 
distance between individual actions and government performance may 
influence taxpayers, we have to look for other cognitive biases, such as the 
isolation effect.  In other words, the degree of remoteness between the 
compulsory payment and the benefit incurred from it is related to the 
isolation effect.  Also called the “focusing effect,’53 it means that “[p]eople 
tend to isolate or focus on a narrow choice problem before them, ignoring 
relevant information”54 that is not presented to them “and otherwise failing 
to integrate their logically connected judgments and decisions into a 
coherent whole.”55  Thus, it may lead individuals to incoherent 
 
supra note 41, at 6 (noting that people feel greater concern toward victims as their reference 
group decreases in size). 
 46.  See Jenni & Lowenstein, supra note 41, at 238-39 (noting that identifiable victims 
represent greatly concentrated distributions of risk within a reference group). 
 47.  Id. at 239. 
 48.  Id. at 253-54; David Fetherstonhaugh et al., Insensitivity to the Value of Human 
Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 283 (1997). 
 49.  Fetherstonhaugh et al., supra note 48, at 284. 
 50.  Id. at 285. 
 51. Small, Helping a Victim, supra note 41, at 7, 14. 
 52.  Id. at 11, 13-14. 
 53.  McCaffery & Baron, supra note 2, at 1751. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
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preferences.56  The isolation effect is not the only factor causing individuals 
to ignore relevant input before making a decision, though.  Decisions are 
also due to simplification57 or other cognitive biases that cause myopia.  To 
some extent, individuals are bound to consider sophisticated components 
and take information relevant in the future into consideration.  For our 
purposes, those decision making short cuts can be grouped together as 
“short-term biases.” 
The direct implication of short-term biases for the present discussion 
is that taxpayers are incapable of properly assessing government spending.  
Government spending involves politics and is not transparent (Wicksell 
refers to this problem in the nineteenth century).58  Even if government 
spending were transparent, it is questionable whether prior to paying taxes 
or filing a statement, any citizen could process all relevant information on 
complex budgetary issues.  McCaffery and Baron believe that due to short-
term biases, people see just what directly affects them without being able to 
take public finance issues (such as redistribution) into account.59  As a 
result, they do not think two steps ahead to understand that when they 
evade, someone is going to suffer.60 
Another aspect of the isolation effect not mentioned above relates to 
cheating.61  Because paying taxes is isolated from the outcome, it takes the 
sting off evasion.  Recall the golf example in the Introduction, or consider 
the difference between downloading illegal music and running away from a 
 
 56.  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 271, 274 (1979) (“In order to simplify the choice 
between alternatives, people often disregard components that the alternatives share, and 
focus on the components that distinguish them.”); see also Amos Tversky, Elimination by 
Aspects: A Theory of Choice, 79 PSYCHOL. REV. 281, 281 (1972) (“When faced with a 
choice among several alternatives, people often experience uncertainty and experience 
inconsistency.”).  
 57.  Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 56, at 275. 
 58.  See infra text accompanying notes 119 and 179. 
 59.  See McCaffery & Baron, supra note 2, at 1786 (noting that the ordinary citizen 
focuses on what is in front of him or her, rather than public finance issues). 
 60.  Contra McCaffery & Baron, supra note 2, at 1780 (In sum, we found no support 
for two hypotheses about why the “starve-the-beast” strategy might gain political support.  
People do not favor deficits, even in the short-term.  Nor are people naively optimistic that 
deficits today will somehow disappear tomorrow.  We found strong support, however, for a 
third hypothesis: People favor spending cuts in general but not in particular.  The “starve-
the-beast” strategy can work—in the sense of getting subjects to support policies of tax cuts 
today that they would not otherwise support—by separating out decisions about tax and 
spending, making the former concrete while keeping the latter abstract, thereby generating 
the conditions for an isolation effect to take hold.)  
(emphasis added). 
 61.  See generally Ariely, supra note 6, at 254 (describing the forces that drive 
dishonest behavior). 
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restaurant without paying for the meal.  Both acts are illegal and both 
offenses are easy enough to perpetrate.  Nevertheless, the first illegal act is 
much more common.  The main reason is not the probability of being 
caught (it is hard to catch both offenders), but peoples’ sense of guilt.  The 
distance between the act and the injured party plays a major role.  
Individuals feel closer to the restaurant crew where they have just eaten 
rather than to the unknown copyright owner.  When we combine this effect 
with the identifiable victim effect regarding taxation, it reinforces our 
conclusion that taxpayers cannot sense the direct consequence of evading 
tax because the outcome is too remote. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES ON THE CORRELATION BETWEEN TAX 
AND RETURN 
This conclusion finds support in experimental studies that find a 
correlation between tax and return.  Some research on tax compliance does 
not focus just on fairness or moral rules,62 but on our sixth reasoning–
taxpayers perception of government spending and policy.63  In general, tax 
compliance increases the more taxpayers agree with government policy.  In 
a 1992 laboratory experiment on taxpayer reactions to diverse policy 
changes, Alm et al.64 had students take part in an unknown number of 
sessions.65  Each received randomly assigned tokens (“income”) and had to 
decide how many to declare.  Some information was revealed to the 
participants, such as the tax rate, the fact that unreported income was not 
taxed, the probability of audit, and the fine for unreported income.  An 
audit was performed randomly and brought to the participants’ attention.  
In another session, participants were introduced to a public good.  Their tax 
payments were then distributed equally among the participants.  In other 
 
 62.  See discussion supra Section III. 
 63.  See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 18, at 850 (“[W]e discuss how taxpayer 
evaluations of government expenditures and government corruption might influence 
compliance.”). 
 64.  See James Alm et al., Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with 
Experimental Data, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 107 (1992) (discussing how compliance with taxpayer 
reporting changes based on audit, penalty, and tax rates); see also Kent W. Smith, 
Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, Introduction to WHY 
PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 223 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992), 
referred to in Andreoni et al., supra note 18, at 851 (describing empirical studies examining 
strategies to effect tax compliance); Michael W. Spicer & S.B. Lundstedt, Understanding 
Tax Evasion, 31 PUB. FIN. 295 (1976) (noting that empirical research shows that norms 
influence taxpayers’ compliance).  
 65.  For a more detailed description of the experiment, see Alm et al., supra note 64, at 
108-09. 
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sessions, some other changes were made.66  Although this model is 
somewhat artificial and has its drawbacks,67 it has also led to some 
interesting findings.  In particular, research revealed: “[c]ompliance is also 
greater when the individuals perceive some benefits from a public good 
funded by their tax payments.”68 
In a later study, Alm et al.69 examined whether tax compliance was 
affected by government expenditures.  They found that tax compliance 
significantly increased when taxpayers had some control over the use of 
their payments and government programs received broad popular support.  
The correlation between tax compliance and government expenditures did 
not receive much attention in the literature until recently.70  Cowell and 
Gordon71 have tested this correlation and claim that “while the government 
taketh away, it also giveth back, and the latter activity surely exerts some 
influence on evasion.”72  Bordignon claims that taxpayers’ decisions to 
evade depend on their perception of fairness, where tax structure, 
government expenditure, and free rider taxpayers establish fairness.73 
Barone and Mocetti, who also refer to Alm et al., empirically study the 
position of the public sector (in Italy) in shaping individuals’ tax morale 
(they do not examine the influence on tax compliance, among other things, 
since it is very difficult to measure).74  Their research focuses on individual 
attitudes towards municipalities’ performance.75  In general, they find a 
negative correlation between low (municipal) tax morale and inefficient 
 
 66.  Id. at 108-09.  
 67.  Id. at 112 (discussing the deficiencies of the model). 
 68.  Id. at 112. 
 69.  Alm et al., supra note 28. 
 70.  Christopher Robert Jones, Understanding and Improving Use-Tax Compliance: A 
Theory of Planned Behavior Approach (July 9, 2009) 28 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Southern Florida) (“Interestingly, little tax research has examined this obvious 
point.”); see also Guglielmo Barone & Sauro Mocetti, Tax Morale and Public Spending 
Inefficiency, 18 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 724, 726-27 (2011) (“Most of these studies analyses 
[sic] how individual socioeconomic characteristics affect tax morale, whereas the evidence 
on the role of institutions is scant.”). 
 71.  Cowell and Gordon clarify the relationship between tax evasion and public 
expenditure by treating public good as one ingredient in the taxpayer portfolio choice.  
Frank A. Cowell & James P.F. Gordon, Unwillingness to Pay: Tax Evasion and Public 
Good Provision, 36 J. PUB. ECON. 305 (1988). 
 72.  Id. at 305. 
 73.  Massimo Bordignon, A Fairness Approach to Income Tax Evasion, 52 J. PUB. 
ECON. 345, 346 (1993) (“[W]e rationalize the ethical norms supporting compliance by 
making them dependent on tax structure, public expenditure and perceived evasion by other 
taxpayers.”). 
 74.  See Barone & Mocetti, supra note 70, at 725 (discussing the public sector generally 
and its effects on tax morale). 
 75.  See, e.g., id. at 729 (discussing the local public spending inefficiencies). 
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allocation of public funds.76  The negative effect of inefficiency increases if 
spending is lower or fiscal independence is higher.77  Their explanation for 
this phenomenon is that first, taxpayers are more aware of how revenue is 
allocated and spent;78 and second, “[g]reater autonomy of local authorities, 
in turn, increases the proximity between the taxpayer and the public sector 
so that citizens assign more responsibilities to municipalities and are more 
responsive to their spending efficiency.”79  Like Alm et al., the authors 
believe that tax morale is higher if taxpayers “see more benefits in return 
for their tax contributions.”80 
Torgler et al., set out: 
to evaluate the impact of voter participation on tax amnesties 
conducting a laboratory experiment.  The results of our 
experiment show that the mere possibility for taxpayers to decide 
on a tax amnesty increases future tax compliance.  It seems that 
the voting procedure, especially public discussions prior to votes, 
is bringing about a sense of civic duty, as taxpayers become 
aware of the importance to contribute to public goods.81 
They concluded that “tax compliance increases significantly when 
people have the opportunity to vote on a tax amnesty.  The strongest effect 
can be achieved when the voting procedure is coupled with pre-voting 
discussion.”82 
Bird, Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler83 empirically examine the tax level 
in various developing countries.  It is interesting to see that their data do 
not focus only on the supply side but also on the demand side.  They take 
into consideration factors such as “institutions, the size of the shadow 
economy, wealth inequality and ‘tax morale’”.84  They believe that “[i]f 
taxpayers perceive that their interests (preferences) are properly represented 
in political institutions and they receive an increased supply of public 
goods, their willingness to contribute increases.”85 
In a laboratory experiment Falsetta et al.86 examine the correlation 
 
 76.  See, e.g., id. at 725 (examining “whether taxpayers living in municipalities where 
public spending is more inefficient show lower tax morale.”). 
 77.  Id. at 726. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 741. 
 81.  Torgler et al., supra note 21, at 377. 
 82.  Id. at 392. 
 83.  Richard M. Bird, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, Societal Institutions 
and Tax Effort in Developing Countries, CREMA Working Paper No. 2004-21. 
 84.  Id. at 3. 
 85.  Id. at 3, 16. 
 86.  Diana Falsetta, and Jennifer Kahle Schafer & George T. Tsakumis, Tax Evasion: 
Audit Probability and the Moderating Role of Goal Conflict (Jan. 28, 2010) (unpublished 
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between tax evasion and goal conflicts.  They find that taxpayers tend to 
pay more taxes when they support government programs.  They focus on 
the use of taxes and how the collected taxes are spent and cause conflicting 
interests.87  They analogize it to the agency problem and claim that when 
there is conflict of interests, taxpayers (agents) will tend to pay less tax to 
the “tax collecting agency”88 (principal).89  Their suggestion is very 
significant to this paper since they recommend that “tax researchers and 
policy makers should investigate ways to better align the goals of the 
taxpayer and the government to increase tax compliance.”90 
Jones91 examines empirically whether tax compliance differs between 
various taxes.92  The taxes at stake are federal income tax and a certain state 
consumption tax (the use tax).93  It seems that although many scholars have 
examined mechanisms to induce tax compliance in the US, they focus on 
federal taxes.94  He finds a positive correlation between, inter alia, the 
“salient beliefs effort”95 and funding for the state and tax fairness96 – the 
prevalent factors in taxpayer decisions to pay the use tax or not.97  We 
believe that the main contribution of Jones’s paper lies in pinpointing the 
specific tax. 
In a recent study highly relevant to our discussion, Li et al.98 ask why 
people tend to donate money to private organizations even while 
complaining about their high tax burden.  Using “real-donation” laboratory 
experiments,99 they show that even though individuals donate also to public 
organizations, they prefer donating to private ones since they favor 
voluntary payments and control over the use of their money.100 
 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 87.  Id. at 1 note 1, and at 6. 
 88.  Id. at 6. 
 89.  Id. at 2, 8. 
 90.  Id. at 2, 16-17. For the limitations of their model see id. at 17-18. 
 91.  Jones, supra note 70. 
 92.  For the limitation of this study see Jones himself, supra note 70, at 68. 
 93.  The use tax is a kind of excise tax imposed by some states.  It is levied on personal 
products purchased by a resident of the state outside of his residence (for example, via 
internet) that would have been taxed had they been purchased within the residence state. 
 94.  Jones, supra note 70, at 2; see also Kornhauser, Tax Morale Approach, supra note 
21, at 632 (proposing that politicians emphasize not just the tax burden but rather “the 
benefits of taxation, or the fact that tax burdens are relatively low both historically and 
relative to other nations. They often talk about taxes generally without differentiating 
between federal taxes and state/local taxes.”). 
 95.  Jones, supra note 70, at 28. 
 96.  Id. at 65. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Li et al., supra note 34. 
 99.  Id. at 1191. 
 100.  In a subsequent study they find that when the targeted donation is specific, not only 
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V. WHAT IS TAX? 
Several mathematical and empirical studies on tax compliance are 
limited,101 mainly because they are inflationary, or refer to a specific 
regime, using the term “tax” even when referring to other compulsory 
payments.  They indicate that there is a certain correlation between 
compulsory payments and public goods; indeed, it makes sense that if a 
person can see a return to his payment it encourages him to pay his share.  
However, to some extent they misconceive taxation.  Some do not share the 
same concept of tax and may lack one significant element, which is the 
nature and differentiation of taxation.  For example, can we deduce the 
same conclusion from municipal payments and federal taxes?  Some 
studies refer to public goods though they treat them more like private goods 
– if you pay you will get a direct return.  However, this is absolutely not 
what taxes stand for in civil societies.  For this reason, it is important to 
first determine what tax is. 
Although just as certain as death, taxes are not simple to define.  
Black’s law defines tax as: 
A charge, usu. monetary, imposed by the government on persons, 
entities, transactions, or property to yield public revenue.  Most 
broadly, the term embraces all governmental impositions on the 
person, property, privileges, occupations, and enjoyment of the 
people, and includes duties, imposts, and excises.102 
Referring to all charges as taxes may be misleading since federal taxes 
are also and perhaps mainly characterized by an important variable not 
included in the above definition – quid pro quo.  The OECD definition is as 
follows: 
Taxes are compulsory, unrequited payments, in cash or in kind, 
made by institutional units103 to government units;104 they are 
 
do taxpayers prefer government donations to private ones but also double their donated 
amount.  Sherry Xin Li et al., Do Earmarks Increase Giving to Government? (Oct. 16, 
2011), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.415.2207 
[https://perma.cc/M2C6-KVSL]. 
 101.  Kornhauser, Tax Morale Approach, supra note 21, at 605.  Mathematical models 
are usually based on some unrealistic assumptions.  Id.  Empirical and particularly 
laboratory studies on tax compliance are somewhat artificial and cannot accurately represent 
reality.  Id. at 605-06.  In addition, any finding cannot be conclusive since it depends, inter 
alia, on the sample and procedure characteristics.  Id. 
 102.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 103.  Institutional unit is defined in OECD, Glossary Statistical Terms, SNA 4.2, 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1413 [https://perma.cc/2CRV-L3S9], as: 
[A]n economic entity that is capable, in its own right, of owning assets, incurring liabilities 
and engaging in economic activities and in transactions with other entities. . . . The resident 
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described as unrequited because the government provides 
nothing in return to the individual unit making the payment, 
although governments may use the funds raised in taxes to 
provide goods or services to other units, either individually or 
collectively, or to the community as a whole.105 
Another definition in the same vein is that tax is “[a] compulsory levy 
made by public authorities for which nothing is received directly in 
return.”106 
In general, tax has three components: first, it is levied by the 
government in a law; second, it is compulsory; and third, it is not directly 
correlated to the benefits provided by the government.107  More concisely 
and elegantly put, “[a] tax is commonly defined as a compulsory levy by 
the government on people’s income or wealth without a direct quid pro 
quo.”108  The third criterion is the most significant for our current 
purposes.109 
 
institutional units that make up the total economy are grouped into five mutually exclusive 
sectors: non-financial corporations; financial corporations; general government; non-profit 
institutions serving households; households.  
 104.  Government units are defined in OECD, Glossary Statistical Terms, SNA 4.104 
[4.19], http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1140 [https://perma.cc/4HXF-FRFH], as: 
“unique kinds of legal entities established by political processes which have legislative, 
judicial or executive authority over other institutional units within a given area.” 
 105.  OECD, Glossary Statistical Terms, Taxes. SNA 7.48 [8.43], 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2657 [https://perma.cc/76MJ-BT8Q] (emphasis 
added). 
 106.  Simon R. James, A DICTIONARY OF TAXATION, 142 (1998).  
 107.  Victor Thuronyi, Tax, in TAXATION & TAX POLICY 375 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. 
eds., 2005). 
 108.  Young-dahl Song & Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A 
Survey, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 442, 442 (1978). 
 109.  See OECD, Definition of Taxes, para III.9 (1996), 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/eg2/eg2963e.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBE4-6L28] (not all 
compulsory payments are taxes. These non-tax compulsory payments can be fees, user 
charges, and tolls. The OECD indicates that occasionally it is difficult to decide whether a 
certain compulsory payment should be considered as tax or not.); see also OECD, Definition 
of Taxes, Id. para III.9 (fees and charges are usually levied in return for a certain 
government service).  However, sometimes the association between the compulsory 
payment and the service provided is rather loose. Therefore, the OECD set guidelines to 
examine whether “a levy could be considered as ‘unrequited.’”  Id., para III.9(a) (one 
indicator is when the compulsory payment largely exceeds the costs of the service); id., para 
III.9(b).  
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VI. ANALYSIS BASED ON THE INTRINSIC FLAW OF TAXATION 
A. General 
Following our definition of tax and discussion of individual cognitive 
biases, we may conclude that an intrinsic flaw of taxation is the perceived 
remoteness of tax payments from government actions. 
In order to promote tax compliance one has to comprehend the 
deliberation process leading up to the taxpayer’s decision to evade.110  To 
do so, it would be insufficient to address the concept of behavioral 
economics in general terms; we have to specifically tackle taxpayer 
cognitive biases.  This paper suggests two cognitive biases: the identifiable 
victim effect and “short-term biases” that may affect taxpayer decisions 
whether to evade tax.  This means we cannot provide only one general 
recommendation.  In a similar vein, albeit in the slightly different context 
of whistleblowing, Feldman and Lobel argue that “there is no one-size-fits-
all solution for policy design.  Rather, policy makers must consider the 
characteristics of the target population of social enforcers and incentivize 
them accordingly.”111 
Through the current examination of one specific behavioral problem, 
we are actually discussing a broader, more profound question in tax 
discourse.  Not only do we have to understand human nature but we also 
have to understand the nature of taxation itself before we can recommend 
mechanisms to enhance compliance.  The problems of tax compliance 
(especially the underreporting and underpayment problems) are not merely 
due to the fact that tax is a compulsory payment.  Many experimental 
studies examine its compulsory payment component.112  Tax is 
characterized also by the lack of direct correlation between payments and 
returns.  There is sufficient quantitative data confirming there is a 
correlation between compliance and government spending, as broadly 
discussed in Section V.  Thus, the perceived remoteness of the compulsory 
payment from its benefit (Type II agency problem), in addition to taxpayer 
cognitive biases, is critical to any compliance discussion. 
What if the government should inform taxpaying parents, for example, 
that their money is spent on education?  Or taxpayers with dependent 
 
 110.  See generally Jones, supra note 70, at 3 (“[A]n important first step in improving 
use-tax compliance is to identify factors associated with the use-tax compliance decision.”). 
 111.  See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1, at 1156; see also id. at 1207 (“An important 
implication of the study is that no one-size-fits-all policy design exists, but rather, policy 
makers must evaluate the full scope of psychological and situational factors in order to 
design the most efficient incentive structures.”).  
 112.  Li et al., supra note 34. 
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relatives that their taxes go to a health program?  Or veterans that their 
taxes are directed to the armed forces?  Such information could align 
taxpayer interests with the government’s and enhance compliance, although 
it is also plausible to assume that even taxpayers without children or 
disabled relatives would be more willing to pay if they know their money is 
spent on education and health, or any other program they believe in or 
support.  This idea follows the Listokin & Schizer’s proposition that if 
taxpayers could support the way their taxes were spent the tax would be 
more effective.113  After specifying the cognitive biases in the paper, it 
seems this kind of information (related to the Type II agency problem) 
could align taxpayer interests with government interests and enhance 
compliance, providing the missing link between the agent (taxpayers) and 
the principal (the government) (Type I agency problem). 
B. A Normative Principle for Tax Allocation: The De Jure Benefit 
Principle and Wicksell’s Connection 
The scenario just presented an idealized setting in which taxpayers can 
choose which program or authority they wish to fund.  This idea bears 
some similarities to the benefit principle.114  It is not a de facto benefit, but 
rather a de jure benefit, which does not undermine equitable objectives.  
The benefit principle means that taxation will be levied in accordance with 
the benefit taxpayers receive from consuming public goods.115  The idea is 
that public goods and services are supplied in the market and traded just 
like any other product.116  In that respect, tax is analogized to a price paid 
for public goods and services.  In other words, the tax is paid in return for 
the benefits the taxpayer receives from the government.  Although the 
benefit principle was widely criticized in the literature, mainly since it 
supports private property at the expense of redistribution,117 this weakness 
is irrelevant for our current purposes since we are referring to the de jure 
benefit – how people perceive that their taxes are utilized.  Nevertheless, 
another criticism raised against the benefit principle, which is relevant here, 
is that government expenditure would depend on taxpayers’ preferences.118 
This idea also bears some similarities to “Wicksellian Connection,”119 
 
 113.  Listokin & Schizer, supra note 4, at 179-80. 
 114.  Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 15, at 61-66.  
 115.  Id. at 62.  
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 63-64. 
 118.  John G. Head, Tax-Fairness Principles: A Conceptual, Historical, and Practical 
Review, in FAIRNESS IN TAXATION 3, 7-8 (Allan M. Maslove ed. 1993); see also Slemrod & 
Bakija, supra note 15, at 63-64.  
 119.  As termed by Albert Brenton, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS: AN ECONOMIC THEORY 
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an approach which deserves a much more thorough elaboration elsewhere.  
The alignment discussion here is partly compatible with the Wicksellian 
approach to expenditures and revenues.120  Wicksell claims “the theory of 
Value and Countervalue had at least the virtue of maintaining some sort of 
contact with the other, the expenditure, side of the public economy.”121  In 
other words, the benefit principle should be applied “on both sides.”122  The 
reason is that only this principle can maintain “some sort of contact with 
the other, the expenditure, side of the public economy.”123  He argues that a 
just and efficient tax system does not focus merely on revenue but at the 
same time on expenditure, and that tax systems should enable taxpayers to 
direct their payments via a rule of unanimity.124  This recommendation, 
however, is designed to promote efficiency and justice and not necessarily 
compliance. 
More recently, Levmore125 demonstrates that in many instances taxes 
serve as ballots (such as charitable deductions) that enhance the social 
choice mechanism.  Levmore thus discusses “Taxes as Ballots” not as a 
means to increase tax compliance, but rather as a tool supporting public 
choice and the democratic process.126 
Relatively few contemporary scholars see, as Bird claims, the 
importance of connecting both sides of the budget.127  The link between 
revenue and expenditure has long been neglected.  Bird supports the 
 
OF POLITICS AND PUBLIC FINANCE 3 (1996). 
 120.  See generally Breton, supra note 119, at 3, 23-24 (“[I]f collective decisions about 
expenditures and revenues are made simultaneously and unanimously, a connection or link 
between costs and benefits . . . will be forged . . . and utility losses will be equal to zero.”); 
James M. Buchanan, The Pure Theory of Government Finance, a Suggested Approach, 57 J. 
POL. ECON. 496, 497 (1949) (asserting that “[t]he maximizing process consists of 
simultaneous determination of all the variables on both sides.” (i.e., expenditure and tax 
variables)); Richard E. Wagner & Knut Wicksell, Contemporary Political Economy, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: INSIGHT ON THE FOUNDERS OF MODERN 
ECONOMICS 523-24 (Jürgen George Backhaus ed., 2012) (describing the Wicksellian 
approach to public finance); Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation, in CLASSICS 
IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 72 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock, eds., 
1958) (arguing for taxation according to benefit).  
 121.  Wicksell, supra note 120, at 74. 
 122.  Id. at 72. 
 123.  Id. at 74. 
 124.  See, e.g., Head, supra note 118, at 9 (due to differential tax burdens we do not 
necessarily support the unanimity rule designed to represent as accurately as possible 
taxpayers’ willingness to pay for public products and services; see also Richard A. 
Musgrave, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 71-72 (McGraw-Hill, 1959) (interpreting the 
approximate unanimity rule). 
 125.  Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387 (1998). 
 126.  Id. at 391-92, 425-26.  
 127.  Richard M. Bird, Evaluating Public Expenditures – Does it Matter How They are 
Financed?, in FISCAL MANAGEMENT 83 (Anwar Shah ed., 2005). 
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revenue-expenditure link and considers it “an essential institutional 
feature.”128  Such a link has the power to reveal people’s preferences and 
increase their participation in the democratic state (as Levmore claims).129  
One way to achieve it is by decentralization—where tax payments are more 
closely aligned with local government expenditures.130  According to Bird, 
“[m]uch more attention should be paid to links between expenditures and 
revenues than has been the rule to date in applied economic analysis of the 
public sector.”131 
We suggest activating the Wicksellian connection132 without 
undermining the equitable principle of raising revenue (the revenue side), 
and at the same time without any significant interfering with the 
expenditure side.  Raising revenue would generally follow the ability-to-
pay notion; this paper suggests no change in the revenue side of the 
equation.  On the contrary, taxpayers who may face noncompliance 
compulsion due to the distance between payments and outcome would be 
able to choose how to direct their funds (without transforming the tax 
system).  This ability to choose is defined here as the de jure benefit 
principle. 
C. Proposal for Enhancing Tax Compliance – General 
Throughout the years scholars have been preoccupied with 
mechanisms for enhancing tax compliance.133  Listokin and Schizer, for 
example, offer some mechanisms which may overcome either the 
compulsory aspect of taxation or the remoteness between payment and the 
outcome,134 such as publicizing government action,135 avoiding government 
waste,136 expanding user fees and increasing the local government’s role in 
 
 128.  Id. at 95. 
 129.  Id. at 96. 
 130.  Id. at 96. 
 131.  Id. at 100 (Bird elaborates on some possible links such as using user charges, 
specific benefit taxes, and local taxes). 
 132.  See, e.g., id. at 101. 
 133.  See supra Section III. 
 134.  Listokin & Schizer, supra note 4, at 193-204.  
 135.  See Gary M. Lucas, Out of Sight, out of Mind: How Opportunity Cost Neglect 
Undermines Democracy, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 249, 322-325 (2015) (stating that this 
technique of increasing the visibility of government benefits may suffer from some flaws.  It 
has the power to misrepresent government achievements and spending and also neglect 
programs’ opportunity costs).  
 136.  See Listokin & Schizer, supra note 4, at 196-98 (governmental waste is open to 
interpretation, however.  One person may consider a certain activity wasteful while the other 
may consider it worthwhile).  
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tax collection.137  In general, these mechanisms may be able to increase tax 
compliance, but they suffer from some flaws, as the authors acknowledge.  
The main problem of those mechanisms is not only that they might 
interfere with the tax system and with government sovereignty (the 
expenditure side), but more severely, that some of them are mainly aimed 
at increasing tax compliance effectiveness without seeking to maintain 
equitable tax collection.  For example, user fees are motivated by the 
benefit principle but not by taxpayer’s ability to pay.138 
For the sake of discussion, let us focus on one possible taxpayer 
preference: stopping military spending.  Pacifists claim that the moral right 
not to take active part in wars also includes the right not to finance wars by 
paying taxes.139  This idea is rooted in American history,140 and is currently 
championed by NPOs such as the National Campaign for a Peace Tax 
Fund (NCPTF),141 which campaigns for a law to enable conscientious 
objectors to direct their taxes to a trust fund dedicated to non-military 
goals.142 
The first peace tax bill was introduced in the American Congress in 
1958143 and amended and reintroduced several times since.144  The bill was 
 
 137.  But see Li et al., supra note 34, at 1199, for the argument that people prefer 
national to local projects. 
 138.  Listokin and Schizer, supra note 4, at 200-201.  The current paper bears some 
similarities to Listokin and Schizer’s paper, but differs in many facets.  First, this paper 
focuses only on the intrinsic flaw of taxation whereby taxpayers are unable to see the 
outcome of their tax payments, whereas Listokin and Schizer also refer to taxation as 
compulsory payment.  Thus, their analogy to donations is thought-provoking but irrelevant 
to the current discussion.  This paper eliminates the compulsory aspect of taxation from the 
discussion.  Second, this paper points out the specific cognitive biases that lead to taxpayers’ 
misunderstanding of tax evasion.  Third, Listokin and Schizer’s suggestion has tremendous 
implications for the tax system: they suggest reorganizing the system by interfering with 
government sovereignty.  This paper is more modest in its implications, and although its 
recommendation has the power to increase tax compliance it is more of a semantic tool that 
hardly interferes with the current system.  Thus, it focuses exclusively on tax systems that 
do not fully apply voluntary tax compliance mechanism.  Finally, and most importantly, 
Listokin and Schizer emphasize the effectiveness of tax compliance even when it may have 
non-equitable consequences.  This paper, on the other hand, stresses the equity principle and 
offers an application that does not undermine it by demonstrating the applicability of a 
normative principle that both maintains equity and enhances compliance. 
 139.  Marjorie E. Kornhauser, For God and Country: Taxing Conscience, 1999 WIS. L. 
REV. 939, 941 (1999).  
 140.  For a more detailed historical overview, see Kornhauser, supra note 139, at 946-81. 
 141.  Welcome to the National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN 
FOR A PEACE TAX FUND, http://www.peacetaxfund.org/ [https://perma.cc/TFL3-2YMD] (last 
updated Jan. 26, 2016). 
 142.  For a partial list of organizations supporting conscientious objection, see 
Kornhauser, supra note 139, at 955.  For the differences between them, see id. at 957-58. 
 143.  H.R. 12310, 85th Cong. (1958) as mentioned in Kornhauser, supra note 139, at 
985. 
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reintroduced in 2015,145 with the aim of affirming “the religious freedom of 
taxpayers who are conscientiously opposed to participation in war, to 
provide that the income, estate, or gift tax payments of such taxpayers be 
used for nonmilitary purposes, to create the Religious Freedom Peace Tax 
Fund to receive such tax payments, to improve revenue collection, and for 
other purposes.”146 
Briefly, this project has two major problems.  First, it limits 
government sovereignty and interferes with its discretionary authority to 
spend public funds;147 second, and more relevant for our purposes, it limits 
itself only to one dimension of public spending.  Thus, it may increase tax 
compliance among peace activists,148 but not necessarily among supporters 
of other laudable, non-military goals such as education or health.  The 
behavioral economic literature suggests additional weaknesses of that 
model, such that this conduct could be contagious and reduce overall 
compliance,149 but this exceeds the scope of the present discussion. 
The proposal of this paper goes two steps beyond the NCPTF concept; 
it is mainly relevant to jurisdictions that do not fully apply voluntary tax 
compliance (tax assessment method) and differs from Listokin and 
Schizer’s paper.150  The American system and partly the Canadian151 and 
the Australian systems152 are considered voluntary systems since the first 
 
 144.  Kornhauser, supra note 139, at 986-89. 
 145.  The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Bill, H.R. 2377, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR 
A PEACE TAX FUND (May 15, 2015), http://www.peacetaxfund.org/thebill/ 
[https://perma.cc/GUL8-Q3W4].   
 146.  H.R. 2483, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/house-bill/2483/text?format=txt [https://perma.cc/PRX6-BLLW].  
 147.  For a different view, see Kornhauser, supra note 139 (supporting the idea of a 
peace tax fund because war tax protesters should not be treated similarly to other tax 
protesters since the former do not threaten the legal system’s legitimacy).  
 148.  Id. at 945, 1011-15. 
 149.  Kornhauser rejects this criticism in For God and Country, supra note 139, at 990. 
 150.  Note, however, that Listokin and Schizer suggest a more comprehensive approach 
including also “allocating voluntary payments” in the US. Listokin & Schizer, supra note 4, 
at 204, 209-13. 
 151.  Although the Canadian tax administration is based on voluntary compliance, it is 
not entirely voluntary since salaries are subject to withholding tax at source.  See Hugh J. 
Ault & Brian J. Arnold, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION – A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 36-37 
(2010) (discussing methods employed by Canadian courts to control tax avaoidance).  For 
individuals who have to lodge a tax return, see CANADA REVENUE AGENCY (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/ndvdls/tpcs/ncm-tx/flng-blgtns/menu-eng.html 
[https://perma.cc/UL96-WHAT]. 
 152.  It is stated in the Australian Taxpayers’ Charter that “[w]e prefer to work with you 
cooperatively, providing you with help to meet your obligations voluntarily.”  Taxpayers’ 
Charter – What you need to know, AUSTL. GOV’T – AUST’L TAX’N OFF 
(https://www.ato.gov.au/printfriendly.aspx?url=/about-ato/about-us/in-detail/taxpayers--
charter/taxpayers--charter---what-you-need-to-know/) [https://perma.cc/5SPJ-TMXA] (last 
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stage in tax collection is the tax assessment by the taxpayers themselves.153  
Nevertheless, there are jurisdictions in which not all (income) tax collection 
is voluntary.  Countries such as Britain and to some extent Canada,154 for 
example, implement withholding taxes on salaries, which compose a large 
portion of overall income taxation (if taxpayers do not reclaim tax 
refunds).155  In this system, employers serve as government collectors and 
employees have no opportunity to evade taxes on their salaries.  This is an 
effective mechanism to eliminate tax evasion.  Another possible technique 
is to minimize cash flows in a country by increasing credit card payments 
to reduce the underground economy.156  Nevertheless, there is no tax 
system that collects solely compulsory taxes. 
Since taxes, by definition and contrary to other compulsory payments, 
are not aligned to the benefits a taxpayer receives in return, and since some 
taxes are collected voluntarily, the government has to endeavor to align 
taxes to taxpayers’ preferences.  Aligning taxes and tax compliance is 
mainly relevant to taxpayers required to file their returns.  The solution this 
paper proposes is also inspired by Mazar, Amir and Ariely’s study.157  
However, we do not propose to sign an honor code on the tax return, but 
rather let taxpayers choose which ministry, department or program they 
wish to finance.  This proposal is similar to Listokin and Schizer’s 
“allocating mandatory payments,”158 though it is only relevant to countries 
that partly apply voluntary tax compliance.  Apparently, it can be easily 
implemented by adding some checkboxes next to taxpayers’ signature on 
the tax return for assigning taxes to preferable policies.  If taxpayers 
receive more detailed choices, it will increase their motivation to comply.159  
 
modified Jan. 5, 2016).  A voluntary compliance program was launched in the 2010-11 
Federal Budget to enhance compliance.  During 2012 the program was extended for an 
additional three years.  GST Voluntary Compliance Research, AUSTRALIAN TAX OFFICE, 
(Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.ato.gov.au/about-ato/research-and-statistics/in-detail/general-
research/gst-voluntary-compliance-research---phase-3-2013/ [https://perma.cc/3FZR-
ZYKU]. 
 153.  Kornhauser, supra note 139, at 941 n.7. 
 154.  Supra note 151. 
 155.  The British law applies “The Pay As You Earn” (PAYE) system.  See Income Tax 
(Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 §§ 682-87; Income Tax (Employments) (Consolidated) 
Regulations, 2001 (S.I.No. 559 of 2001) § 28. 
 156.  For a report on the shadow economy in Europe and the effectiveness of credit cards 
in mitigating the problem, see Friedrich Schneider, Ph.D., The Shadow Economy in Europe, 
VISA 1 (2013), 
https://www.visaeurope.com/media/pdf/the%20shadow%20economy%20in%20europe%20
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAS4-J92U]. 
 157.  Mazar, Amir & Ariely, supra note 3.  
 158.  Listokin and Schizer, supra note 4, at 204, 212-15. 
 159.  Nevertheless, in cases of massive organized cooperation by taxpayers prior to filing 
tax reports, a detailed choice mechanism can divert choices to one main policy.  Id. at 208. 
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Naturally, this mechanism requires administrative arrangements to channel 
the dedicated funds.  This mechanism will be able to overcome the biases 
outlined in the paper and the third component of the tax definition.  
Imagine that you check the “education” or “elementary education” box on 
your tax return; when you take your child to school in the morning you 
could tell your child: “Do you know that because mammy and daddy paid 
their taxes, the playground in your school was redecorated and now you 
and your friends can play there safely?” 
Is the above scenario apocalyptic?  We believe that following the 
foregoing analysis the proposal in this paper is feasible.  Indeed, it has 
recently been echoed in a proposal raised in Oxfordshire County Council, 
England, to allow members of the community to voluntarily pay more taxes 
(i.e., donate to the local council) and choose which project they wish to 
fund.160 
D. Detailed Mechanism for Implementing the Proposal 
Changing the Tax Returns. As mentioned above, the mechanism 
required to implement the proposal is simply to add a checkbox in tax 
returns, letting taxpayers choose which ministry, department or program 
they wish to finance.  Although it is quite straightforward to reprint the new 
tax returns this is naturally only the first step required by the government.  
In order to fully implement the proposal, the government has to set up an 
administrative mechanism to channel tax payments to the dedicated funds.  
Only a credible transparent procedure can serve this compliance goal, as 
elaborated below under Transparency Requirements. 
Voluntary Tax System and Government Sovereignty.  The mechanism 
presented here for aligning tax payments and public goods leads to an 
apparent deadlock.  On the one hand, it enhances compliance, but on the 
other hand it seems unrealistic: even if we overcome the practical 
difficulties it involves, can any government afford to base its expenditure 
on taxpayer preferences?  Could it plan ahead and carry out long-term 
policies?  To some extent, as elaborated below, the idea is practicable if we 
assume a heterogeneous society.  Assuming that the government follows on 
taxpayer choices (otherwise trust will be eroded and compliance rates 
 
 160.  Income Generation Cabinet Advisory Group, Notice of a Meeting, OXFORDSHIRE 
COUNTY COUNCIL (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://mycouncil.oxfordshire.gov.uk/documents/g4263/Public%20reports%20pack%20Tues
day%2014-Jan-
2014%2012.30%20Income%20Generation%20Cabinet%20Advisory%20Group.pdf?T=10 
[https://perma.cc/BRQ6-GYUA].  
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drop),161 though, how could it function under such conditions?  Assuming 
an extreme scenario where all taxpayers turn out to be environmentalists, 
for example, and all check the environment box, how could the government 
run the country?162  Although this scenario is somewhat unlikely (since 
societies are not homogenous), clearly it would be impracticable for a tax 
system totally based on voluntary compliance.163  In other countries, when 
voluntary compliance is partial and there are other efficient tax collection 
mechanisms (such as withholding taxes164 and VAT),165 the government can 
let taxpayers choose how to spend their income tax money and allocate the 
rest of its tax revenues according to its exclusive discretion. 
A simple example will illuminate this point.  Assume that the 
government equally allocates its resources between program X and 
program Y.  Assume also that the population is equally divided between 
taxpayers who pay their taxes voluntarily via tax returns and taxpayers who 
pay their taxes non-voluntarily (thus having no opportunity to evade taxes) 
and that all taxpayers have the same ability to pay.  If the taxpayers who 
pay voluntarily choose to finance only program X, the government will not 
need to change its policy and future programs since it will be able to 
allocate the taxes collected compulsorily to program Y.  Thus, the 
government has enough latitude to fund its programs while still honoring 
taxpayer preferences and directing their taxes to the program they choose. 
This latitude disappears if the government depends solely or mainly 
on voluntary tax compliance.  In this case, the solution could be slightly 
different, though we do believe that the proposal is more suitable for a 
semi-voluntary tax compliance system.  Taxpayer returns could still 
include checkboxes but in this case the tax returns should state that only a 
certain percentage would be directed to the programs selected.  Naturally, 
this percentage depends on macro estimates and also slightly erodes the 
incentive to pay, but this solution is still better than no alignment at all.  
 
 161.  We leave the discussion on the proper mechanism to maintaining this trust for 
future elaboration.  
 162.  For a similar concern that taxpayers may feel more enthusiastic about one program 
and not the other, see Listokin and Schizer, supra note 4, at 206. 
 163.  For a discussion on voluntary compliance, see the above discussion accompanying 
footnotes 151-154. 
 164.  See the above text accompanying footnotes 154-155. 
 165.  Because value-added tax is an input for one taxpayer and an output for another it is 
difficult for taxpayers to evade it.  Because this tax is easy to enforce it is used worldwide 
(except for North America).  See Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 15, at 195 (stating that the 
VAT is commonly used around the world, in part, because it is easy to administer and 
enforce).  
  Further, it was empirically observed that jurisdictions that collect VAT raise more 
taxes (albeit not significantly).  Michael Keen & Ben Lockwood, Is the VAT a Money 
Machine?, 59 Nat’l Tax J. 905-28 (2006). 
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Following the previous example, we now assume that everyone has to file 
tax returns.  If all taxpayers prefer program X, then the government will not 
be able to finance program Y.  Although this scenario indicates the 
program’s legitimacy and that of the democratic state (which is somewhat 
beyond the direct scope of this paper, but we will refer to it immediately 
below), if the tax return states that at least 50% of the taxes will be spent 
according to taxpayer preferences then the government could allocate its 
funds equally between programs X and Y, as before, without having to 
change its budget.  We guess that the cynical among you say pecunia non 
olet.166  We agree, but we believe that especially after discussing the 
specific cognitive biases we would like to know that our money is directly 
spent on programs we approve of, such as the school playgrounds. 
Legal Quandaries.  The proposed plan does not suggest that taxpayers 
choose how much tax to pay but rather how to spend their taxes.  These 
choices are completely different from the legal perspective.  Although in a 
democracy taxes are imposed only by law (see the above discussion on tax 
components),167 some quandaries may arise in different jurisdictions if 
taxpayers can actually decide how to allocate the budget.  This may raise 
some legal concerns that have to be resolved.  Nevertheless, the current 
proposal suggests that taxpayers do not really affect the budget but merely 
feel their tax payments carry some weight. 
Equity Issues. A possible grave quandary concerns taxpayer equality.  
Naturally, the government has to honor taxpayers’ choices without 
violating other citizens’ rights.  The problem that can arise is that in any 
democratic election, each voter168 has only one vote, whereas each taxpayer 
pays a different amount.  Therefore, the government should be sensitive to 
taxpayers’ wishes without letting some taxpayers have greater influence.  
Apparently, following the present proposal, taxpayers with higher ability to 
pay can be more influential on budget decisions and thus compromise the 
basic democratic concept that each person has only one vote.169  Since the 
system is mainly applicable in a semi-voluntary compliance system and 
since we believe that after careful macro calculation it will not change 
government policy, the question is merely semantic.  Normally, it really 
would not matter whether taxpayers have differential payment ability 
 
 166.  In Latin, “money does not smell.” 
 167.  See Section VI. 
 168.  For a discussion on using taxpayer as voters, see Levmore, supra note 125, at 388, 
who argues that “[t]he ‘votes’ cast through deductible contributions generate a measure of 
preferences that is in some ways superior and in other ways inferior to other polling 
devices.” 
 169.  This concern was also raised by Listokin and Schizer. Listokin & Schizer, supra 
note 4, at 208-09 (stating that “wealthy citizens are likely to have more personal influence 
on the overall allocation than low-income taxpayers.”). 
ARTICLE 6 (RIZA) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:32 PM 
2016] THE INTRINSIC FLAW IN TAXATION 915 
 
because each taxpayer payment is only a drop in the bucket.  Nevertheless, 
it may have an adverse effect in extreme scenarios involving high-net-
worth individuals.  To prevent these individuals from disproportionately 
affecting budget decisions we can adopt either of two mechanisms.  First, 
after macro calculation, we can state in the tax returns that each taxpayer is 
assumed to have the same ability to pay and his payments equal a certain 
quota.  A simple example can illustrate this point.  Assume there are only 
two taxpayers A and B, and that A is required to pay 20 and B 80.  In this 
scenario the average ability to pay is 50, and each taxpayer is deemed to 
pay a 50 quota.170  This means that if you are A, you will have even more 
incentive to pay since you can direct not only your tax share to a certain 
fund but also an additional 30.  Note, however, that this would leave B with 
relatively less influence on the budget.  The second mechanism can 
overcome this problem.  Since the problem is relevant only to taxpayers 
with high net worth, we can impose a certain ceiling.  This upper limit will 
restrict and prevent these individuals from having greater influence than the 
average taxpayer and maintain the equity principle. 
Transparency Requirements.  Finally, we would like to discuss the 
transparency issue.  The model proposed here supports the public right to 
know how government collects and uses its taxes (which is one key aspect 
of transparency).  As demonstrated here, this information is vital to tax 
compliance and to some extent, as elaborated above, important to 
democracy.171  It gives the government an annual opportunity to receive 
taxpayer feedback and enables it to take their choices into account without 
compromising equality principles.172  In that respect, it upholds the 
transparency principle.173  To prevent information manipulation, it would 
be sufficient to specify how much was directed to health, education, etc.  It 
is interesting to observe that some tax authorities, as in the United 
Kingdom,174 are concerned with governmental transparency tax issues.175  A 
 
 170.  This solution does not take into considerations voters who for various reasons are 
excluded from paying taxes. 
 171.  Listokin and Schizer also raise the problem of taxpayers who have to act on the 
basis of incomplete information.  Listokin & Schizer, supra note 4, at 206-07 (stating that 
“we may worry that taxpayers will allocate money based on inexpert judgments and 
imperfect information, so that the results will diverge.”). 
 172.  For preserving equity issues see the discussion in the former paragraph. To achieve 
equality the paper does not necessarily support the unanimity rule discussed above under 
supra note 124. 
 173.  See Bird, Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, supra note 83, at 11-12 (supporting a 
transparent linkage between expenditure and revenue in discussing how to increase tax 
collection in developing countries).  
 174.  And Australia. See, e.g., Australian Taxpayers’ Charter, supra note 152 (“To foster 
that confidence, we [Australian Tax Authorities] need to have a relationship with the 
community based on mutual trust and respect. We nurture that relationship by: being open, 
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survey made in the United Kingdom for HM Revenue & Customs reveals 
that taxpayers are more aware of bank account transactions than their tax 
payments and offers some recommendations to increase personal tax 
transparency.176  One of the proposals that received support by more than 
half of the survey’s participants was to receive a statement showing how 
payments “contribute to different areas of Government” spending.177  This 
proposal is very interesting and can be viewed as the converse of the 
proposal set in this paper.  However, while it may increase transparency, at 
the same time it can be counterproductive to tax compliance if a taxpayer 
believes that too much of his tax payments support a ministry or program 
he would rather not support.  Recall, however, that our focus is on the other 
side of transparency—increasing the transparency of the expenditure (ex 
ante), not the revenue side (ex post). 
Many scholars believe that lack of governmental transparency is 
associated mainly with corruption.  The higher level of transparency 
according to these scholars means a lower level of corruption.178  The idea 
is that transparency can tackle corruption since it overcomes the 
asymmetric information problem.  The model suggested here facilitates a 
more transparent communication between government and taxpayers as 
already suggested by Wicksell.179  Wicksell, for example, points to the 
importance of the press in informing taxpayers on the expenditure side.180  
In this paper, we suggest that in order to gain public trust the information 
should come directly from the government itself.  The communication 
would be reciprocal in that it would both inform the government on 
taxpayer wishes and the latter on government actions.  In order for the 
model to work and for people not to claim that pecunia non olet, 
governments also have to prove to taxpayers that their choices matter.  One 
possible approach could be to require government to reveal cases in which 
it has honored taxpayer wishes but also those incidents in which it has 
disregarded them. 
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The proposal here bears some similarity to Wicksell’s connection 
though it is not identical.  Wicksell believes that the benefit principle 
should apply on both sides.  In this paper we do not focus on the revenue 
side but tackle only the tax compliance problem.  Wicksell focuses on 
voluntary consent for tax payment, while this paper discusses seemingly 
voluntary consent on tax usage.  Therefore, like Wicksell but for a different 
rational, we should endeavor to better inform taxpayers on the expenditure 
side to enhance tax compliance. 
A more modest suggestion based on the rationale presented here 
would be to apply the checkbox scheme to specific tax forms, rather than to 
the main general tax returns,181 where individuals have to declare only a 
specific income, mainly one that is difficult to monitor and enforce.  For 
example, income related to cross-border transactions by a resident 
taxpayer.182  Governments endeavor to induce taxpayers to disclose those 
incomes by various tools, such as voluntary disclosure and amnesties.183  
Since forms declaring such specific incomes are not submitted by all or 
even most taxpayers, there is no fear they would have inequitable effects or 
interfere with government sovereignty. 
CONCLUSION 
This article applies a bi-disciplinary approach to tax compliance, 
combining behavioral economic insights and tax discourse.  In order to 
maximize compliance, it is insufficient to refer to behaviors in general – we 
need to specifically tackle taxpayers’ cognitive biases.  The paper focuses 
on two such biases and finds that taxpayers are largely indifferent to the 
distal damage caused by tax evasion (by virtue of the identifiable victim 
effect) and cannot properly process government expenditures (due to so-
called “short-term” biases).  The perceived remoteness of the compulsory 
payment from its benefit (Type II agency problem) is critical to any 
compliance discussion.  The paper likens this discussion to a snowball, 
carrying down the slope the identifiable victim effect, the literature aligning 
taxpayers and public goods, the isolation effect and the fundamental nature 
of taxation.  We do hope our discussion managed to stop that proverbial 
snowball and attain some order in the form of our practical 
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recommendation. 
This paper discusses the inherent flaw of taxation—the unrequited 
payment—which impedes tax compliance.  The solution proposed for this 
inherent flaw, which overcomes taxpayers’ cognitive biases, is a de jure 
benefit principle, which means that while they do not pay directly for the 
public goods they consume, they do choose how the state would benefit 
from their taxes and allocate public goods, without interfering with the 
democratic order and state sovereignty.  It allows taxpayers to choose 
which public good they wish to fund with their taxes, somewhat in line 
with the Wicksellian approach.  This application is mainly suitable to tax 
systems which do not apply fully voluntary tax compliance. 
The model proposed here supports the public’s right to know how the 
government collects and uses its taxes, which is vital to tax compliance.  It 
facilitates a more transparent communication between government and 
taxpayers as suggested by Wicksell, informing the government on taxpayer 
wishes and the latter on government actions (thereby solving both Type I 
and Type II agency problems).  The elegance of this solution is that it does 
not interfere with equity criteria for tax collection, and ultimately does not 
violate equitable allocation of tax payments.  Nevertheless, it has the power 
to overcome a specific tax compliance problem caused by the remoteness 
of tax payments from their use without impeding the equity perception of 
collecting tax (the revenue side) or transforming the tax system (the 
expenditure side). 
 
